Verifiable End To End Secure OCI Native Machines
summary
End to end toolchain that signs and ships entire machine images as OCI artifacts and verifies them at boot using UEFI secure boot plus TPM sealed policies, proving a running host matches the signed manifest. Uses cosign, dmverity, stacker and zot to build squashfs+verity layers, publish a signed install manifest, and verify digests and signatures at initrd time. Shim contains three built‑in keys that unlock TPM secrets so the SUDI key and LUKS unlock cannot be extracted if firmware or UKI change. Prototype tooling exists but the integration glue and non‑TPM alternatives remain work in progress.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (14)
- 0:00Secure boot for appliances
- 4:37Secure boot and UEFI chain
- 8:52Mars workflow with unified kernel
- 11:23TPM features and PCR measurements
- 16:28Secure boot for cluster attestation
- 18:14OCI and OCI layouts
- 21:51Signing OCI artifacts securely
- 23:14Full boot with OCI rootfs
- 27:44Key management at Cisco
- 30:58End-to-end secure OCI
- 36:03Machine architecture and future
- 37:27Non-TPM platforms and tokens
- 42:19Q&A on revocation and TPM
- 45:27Closing remarks
related talks
35mHardening OS Distribution: Verifiable and sealed OS with bootc and composefs
49mSecure Boot from A to Z
43mTowards Secure Unified Kernel Images for Generic Linux Distributions and Every...
42mPractical Application of Verified Boot
31mSign, Attest, and Verify! A Practical Guide for Software Supply...- 42mPractical Application of Verified Boot
59mLayered Attestation of a Cross-Domain System
01h 05mImmutable and Stateless Systems with systemd