Security in Zephyr and Fuchsia
summary
Zephyr adds hardware-enforced memory protections (landed in 1.8/1.9) and kernel memory protection tests modeled on Linux KSPP that catch regressions; user space support arrives in 1.10/1.11 as user space threads not full processes, with application-memory helpers coming in 1.13 and MPU limits (often eight regions) driving build-time/boot-time approaches. Fuchsia centers on the Zircon microkernel with object-capability handles, resource handles, job policies and VDSO enforcement; many access checks and revocation controls remain unimplemented and root-handle leaks are a critical risk.
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chapters (26)
- 0:00Intro
- 1:46Zephyr and Fuchsia
- 2:26What is Zephyr?
- 3:45Zephyr: In the beginning
- 5:01Zephyr: Motivation for OS protections
- 6:35Zephyr: Hardware Limitations . Most microcontrollers back a MMU
- 7:35Zephyr: Protection Design Constraints
- 9:26Zephyr: Basic Memory Protections
- 11:11Zephyr: Userspace Support
- 12:26Zephyr: Userspace Memory Model
- 13:45Zephyr: Userspace Kernel Interface
- 16:29Zephyr: Application Memory
- 18:01Zephyr: App Shared Memory Example
- 18:44Zephyr: Areas for Future Work
- 25:07Fuchsia Security Mechanisms
- 25:28Fuchsia: (Regular) Handles
- 27:22Fuchsia: Resource Handles
- 28:38Fuchsia: Job Policy
- 31:24Fuchsia: Namespaces and Sandboxing
- 33:15Fuchsia: Bootstrap / Process Creation
- 34:14Fuchsia: A Case for MAC
- 35:18Fuchsia & MAC: Design Options
- 35:49Full Kernel Support for MAC
- 37:13Current Work - Examples
- 39:34Fuchsia vs Linux OS security
- 40:36Questions?
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35mZephyr OS Memory Protection- 35mZephyr OS Memory Protection
41mUserspace in Zephyr: Overview and Practicality
41mUserspace in Zephyr: Overview and Practicality
40mZephyr Project Security Status
27mZephyr and Trusted Execution Environments
27mZephyr and Trusted Execution Environments
37mThe Hacker’s Perspective: Zephyr OS and On-Device Runtime Protection