What should I know about secure boot and TEEs?
summary
Explains why secure boot must pair with TEEs to stop a malicious bootloader from spoofing a runtime: TPM (2007) is usually a separate chip and cannot do DMA so the OS must feed it integrity measurements; TrustZone provides one secure and one non‑secure world and often runs a secure OS; SGX enclaves isolate encrypted enclave memory on Intel and OP-TEE is the common open TEE on ARM. Notes TF‑A/TFM as open firmware, UEFI integration via secure variable storage, and that no single app model yet runs across all TEE types.
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chapters (23)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:27Martas background
- 1:27Why talk about secure boot
- 5:23Why secure boot
- 8:09Who do you trust
- 9:39Traditional Embedded System
- 11:08Secure Boot
- 11:58TPM
- 15:39TEE diagram
- 16:38TPM vs TEE
- 17:37Firmware
- 19:06SGX
- 20:11Simp
- 20:48Comparison
- 22:08Confidential Computing Initiative
- 23:24Summary
- 24:40Embedded vs Cloud
- 26:31How to link it all
- 28:16Neural use case
- 29:33Open source solutions
- 30:40Links
- 30:54Conclusion
- 32:51QA
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