Secure Software Distribution in an Adversarial World
summary
Argues that distribution infrastructure must be treated as actively malicious, so HTTPS and raw GPG signatures are inadequate because they allow rollback and mix‑and‑match attacks. Proposes concrete defenses: freshness to prevent downgrades, signed collections to bind versions and dependencies, a key hierarchy with short‑lived delegated keys and transparent rotation, and threshold signing for multi‑party approval. Implements these ideas with an opinionated TUF implementation called notary and integrates notary into docker to provide the claimed guarantees.
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chapters (16)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:35Software Distribution
- 3:30What about HTTPS
- 4:50What about GPG
- 6:15Heartbleed
- 7:38Application of signatures
- 8:45Software update system
- 9:10Freshness
- 10:25Security of Packages
- 11:15Key Ki
- 12:00Key Hierarchy
- 12:35Cloud Keys
- 13:55Transparent Key Rotation
- 14:50Threshold Signing
- 16:15Update Framework
- 16:50Conclusion
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