Bypassing Anti-DDoS at Telecom Operators
summary
Examines why ISPs often fail to protect customers from DDoS even when they could, arguing for multiple defense echelons. Describes countermeasure algorithms used by provider-level anti-DDoS systems (Arbor, Radware, custom scrubbing centers) and analyzes attack vectors that exploit provider-level protection features.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00Introduction
- 3:03Why operator won't help
- 5:33Anti-DDoS system types
- 12:17Attacks on symmetric defense
- 22:05Attacks on operator routing
- 24:35Multivector attack on shift team
- 28:26Layered attack defense
- 33:23Protection level interaction
- 34:08Symmetric defense downsides
- 35:52Cloud providers limits
- 37:40Perfect defense impossible
- 38:46Attack response plan
- 39:31Q&A
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