Discussion - Bridges, Session 11
summary
pre-crime filter has run since May and flagged nothing while checking all messages; the Nomad exploit could have drained the whole pool in ~10 minutes but the attacker chose a decentralized grab instead; aggregators widen attack surface and must be opinionated about included bridges or risk exposing funds; library-based upgrades give optionality so apps can opt into new validation libraries while preserving censorship-proof messaging at the protocol layer; custodial EOAs/MPC bridges still carry insider or state actor risk.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:05Pre-crime approach deployment
- 1:47Nomad hack technical reasons
- 2:31Bridge aggregation risks
- 3:59Protocol and liquidity upgrades
- 6:07Upgrade challenges and adoption
- 8:17Opt-in versus opt-out upgrades
- 10:03Fund recovery mechanisms
- 10:44Incentive misalignment in bridges
- 12:10Censorship resistance in bridges
- 13:37Designing censorship-resistant systems
- 15:02Bridges as execution layers
- 15:24Avalanche Bridge architecture
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