A Case for Governators
summary
Proposal to add a new on-chain role called a governator that decouples block production from governance representation, letting stakers opt to assign one validator for blocks and another for votes. Notes a measured problem: ~24% of voting power rarely votes, many exchanges avoid governance for legal reasons. Suggests recording voting-delegations on-chain, reviving targeted governance slashing, and funding governators via an 80/20 (or 90/10) split of staking rewards. Raises trade-offs: populism, validator profitability, and two-step upgrades for safety.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:13What is a governator
- 4:33Validator roles evolution
- 8:08Code versus social consensus
- 12:26Separating block production
- 16:18On-chain governator
- 19:30Governance expectations
- 21:17Open discussion and call for collaboration
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