~/talk

Algorithmic Bayesian Mechanism Design

name:Yang Cai
links:none on file
slides:none on file

Provides an algorithmic framework that computes exact Bayesian revenue-optimal mechanisms for multi-item additive bidders (items may be correlated) by solving a succinct LP of reduced forms and using a polynomial-time separation oracle (Border-style feasibility plus separation/optimization). Shows every optimal mechanism is a distribution over virtual-welfare maximizers and gives a black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design by adding a virtual-welfare term. Framework extends to approximation, budgets, risk-aversion and matching known algorithmic approximation factors, and yields efficient implementable auctions.

AI-written summary · about

  1. 0:00Introduction
  2. 0:21Motivation
  3. 1:02Auctions
  4. 1:22Approximation Algorithms
  5. 2:12Optimal Auction
  6. 3:13Algorithm vs Mechanism Design
  7. 4:25Blackbox Reduction
  8. 7:35Margins Auction
  9. 8:06Black Box Reduction
  10. 10:58Framework Overview
  11. 17:45Constraints
  12. 19:28Separation Oracle
  13. 20:44Where are we
  14. 21:34Full Characterization Theorem
  15. 23:08General Settings
  16. 25:05Extensions
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