Algorithmic Bayesian Mechanism Design
summary
Provides an algorithmic framework that computes exact Bayesian revenue-optimal mechanisms for multi-item additive bidders (items may be correlated) by solving a succinct LP of reduced forms and using a polynomial-time separation oracle (Border-style feasibility plus separation/optimization). Shows every optimal mechanism is a distribution over virtual-welfare maximizers and gives a black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design by adding a virtual-welfare term. Framework extends to approximation, budgets, risk-aversion and matching known algorithmic approximation factors, and yields efficient implementable auctions.
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chapters (16)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:21Motivation
- 1:02Auctions
- 1:22Approximation Algorithms
- 2:12Optimal Auction
- 3:13Algorithm vs Mechanism Design
- 4:25Blackbox Reduction
- 7:35Margins Auction
- 8:06Black Box Reduction
- 10:58Framework Overview
- 17:45Constraints
- 19:28Separation Oracle
- 20:44Where are we
- 21:34Full Characterization Theorem
- 23:08General Settings
- 25:05Extensions
