Extortion and Cooperation in the Zero-day Market
summary
Builds a game‑theory model called the 0‑day dilemma and shows cooperation can emerge without escrow if the seller can credibly punish defecting buyers by public disclosure as punishment; identifies a concrete extortion pathway via zero‑determinant extortion where a knowledgeable trader forces favorable splits against evolutionary opponents; shows fully anonymous markets can sustain cooperation with costly retaliation but semi‑anonymous markets enable extortion; gives actionable rules (seller supplies first when possible, cast a long shadow of the future, avoid anonymous counterparties).
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chapters (31)
- 0:00Start
- 4:38Inherent obstacles
- 5:08A hairy business
- 6:23Transparency and price fairness
- 7:14Tension
- 8:17Demonstrate
- 9:42Exclusive rights to the buyer
- 10:56Proposed solutions
- 12:01Motivating questions
- 14:36Information Security Prediction
- 16:02Nation-state actors
- 18:14Prisoner's Dilemma
- 19:15The 0-Day Dilemma
- 21:49Submissive scenario
- 22:24Adaptive scenario
- 23:25MAD scenario
- 24:33FD & Brinkmanship
- 25:03Fair share of troubles
- 27:51Three settings
- 28:38William Press and Freeman Dyson
- 28:52Sentient Player
- 29:04Zero Determinant (ZD) Strategies
- 29:42Evolutionary players
- 30:00Extortion strategies
- 30:59Extortionist strategy: Example
- 35:50Anonymous Black Market
- 36:14Camera and Casari 3
- 38:36Hacking Team leaks
- 40:59To sum up
- 41:46Recommendations
- 42:58Experimental verification
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