Zero Trust in the Cloud with WebAssembly and WasmCloud
summary
Claims that WebAssembly eliminates buffer-overflow exploits by trapping undefined behavior and forbids arbitrary pointers, demonstrated with wasmTime rejecting a module that tries file I/O; WASI requires pre-opened file descriptors so a runtime must grant disk or network access; wasmCloud layers a capability model with Ed25519-signed claims (JWT-like) embedded in modules, vets capabilities at runtime, and runs tiny Rust-built modules (~300KB module sizes) across clusters, on Raspberry Pi or in-browser, scaling from one to thousands with microsecond restarts.
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chapters (7)
- 0:00Zero trust and WebAssembly intro
- 2:09WebAssembly security basics
- 9:29Runtime security limits
- 16:18Capability security with wasmCloud
- 24:14Cluster security in distributed systems
- 27:09Portability and performance
- 30:42Q&A
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