Anti-Fee-Sniping and Privacy for Taproot Transactions
summary
BIP326 standardizes use of nSequence on Taproot outputs to hide Lightning channel closures by randomly choosing per-input relative locktime or per-transaction nLockTime, implemented in Rust atop the bdk_tx crate. It requires segwit v1 (Taproot) and tx version ≥2, needs RBF signaling for nSequence, and falls back to nLockTime for inputs with input >65,535 confirmations. Implementation uses a 10% backward range and a 50% probability toggle, improving anonymity sets and reducing fee‑sniping incentives.
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chapters (9)
- 0:00Fee sniping in Bitcoin
- 1:28Endlock time vs fee sniping
- 3:12Taproot and MAST privacy
- 5:42HTLC vs PTLC privacy
- 7:36BIP 326 anti-fee-sniping
- 11:14Bitcoin Dev Kit code
- 22:43BIP 326 future impacts
- 25:42Q&A input confirmations
- 28:11Q&A privacy defaults
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