Supply Chain Anarchy - Trojaned Binaries in the Java Ecosystem
summary
Claims an automated pipeline that matches repositories, builds code, and runs a security diff across Java libraries, tolerating compiler noise so only real bytecode differences flag. The experiment builds hundreds of projects, compares produced jars to central repo artifacts, and finds about 11% mismatch between source and distributed binaries. Demonstrates concrete trojan techniques (classloader payloads, backdoored jar replacement, typosquatting) and emphasizes that library code runs with full application privileges.
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chapters (4)
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