More Than a CSIRT: Lessons Learned from Supporting a National Response to COVID-19
summary
CISA forms a COVID Task Force that pairs federal analysts with temporary experts, assesses the vaccine cold chain and tiered supply chain (tier 0 = R&D, tier 1 ≈100 orgs, ~6,000 healthcare delivery sites), and connects ransomware-driven outages to increased excess deaths (analysis cited in CDC/medical outlets; 150,000 excess deaths noted Feb 2021). Concrete outputs include a short bad practices list, a Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, cyber hygiene scans, red teams, persistent threat hunting and tabletop packages; some pilots scale, persistent hunting proves resource intensive.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Start
- 3:31CISA COVID-19 Task Force (CTF) Timeline
- 6:32Analyzing the Mission Space ("Ball Bearings")
- 9:55Forming the CTF
- 10:40Example CTF Analysis: "Provide Medical Care"
- 12:36Conceptual Model of Cascading Impacts
- 14:16Hospital Services and Departments Disrupted by Cyber Attack
- 15:32Conceptual Model of Impact of Cyber Attack on Patient Outcomes
- 17:52Bad Practices
- 24:45Cross-Sector Analysis & Risks to Critical Infrastructure
- 25:46Lessons Learned for Future Task Forces
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