Scaling Ethereum: MEV Roast
2021-05-13
-- online --
who it's for
sequencer operators, rollup engineers, blockchain validators, mev searchers, protocol researchers, distributed-systems engineers, decentralized finance maintainers, governance operators
topics
sequencer auctions for ordering; encrypted transaction submissions; verifiable delay functions (VDF); randomized ordering via VDF shuffle; priority gas and off-chain PGA; flashbots-style proposer bundling; sequencer election and committee design; liquidation MEV and keeper dynamics; secret-leader and encrypted bundles; optimistic rollup sequencer risks; validator proposer selection effects
| title | author | length |
|---|---|---|
| MEV is Fundamental to Permissionless Systems | Phil Daian | 31m |
Claims that MEV is unavoidable in permissionless systems because transcriptability, interoperability and diverse trust models create persistent arbitrage and… | ||
| MEV Minimization on L2: Solution Space and Design Constraints | Eli Ben-Sasson | 18m |
Argues that VDFs and cryptographic time‑locks sit in the practical sweet spot for MEV minimization on L2, outlining two concrete designs: time‑lock on… | ||
| MEV Scaling Ethereum Panel | Vitalik Buterin, Justin Drake, Phil Daian | 22m |
Argues that MEV acts as a real centralization pressure: specialized infra and network proximity favor large block proposers, while Flashbots searcher-miner… | ||
| From MEV Auction (MEVA) to Sequencer MEV Extraction | Karl Floersch | 21m |
Argues that MEVA can be turned into a revenue stream that funds public goods by auctioning the right to order transactions, selling the sequencer auction… | ||
| Defining the MEV Game on L2 | Georgios Konstantopoulos | 18m |
Claim that MEV cannot be eliminated but can be reduced by changing mempool rules, sequencer election, and transaction encryption, with concrete mitigations… | ||
| The MEV Game on L2: Bots, Users, Sequencers Dynamics | Stani Kulechov, Georgios Konstantopoulos, David Goldberg, Barry Whitehat | 26m |
Discussion gives concrete tradeoffs: liquidations often use flash loans and create hot competition; Synthetix uses a debt pool model that shifted front‑running… | ||
| MEV on eth2 | Alex Obadia | 27m |
MEV persists after the merge because transaction ordering still uses the same client software and P2P layer, with validators selected in advance to propose… | ||
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