Post-Quantum Cryptography Conference Ottawa 2023
as the organisers put it
Speakers at this conference include some of the world’s top Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) experts and come from government science agencies, standards bodies, and private organizations at the forefront of this new challenge to digital security. Topics will cover the status of PQC standardization at NIST, ETSI, and IETF, government preparations, migration strategies, etc.
who it's for
PKI engineers, security architects, security engineers, cryptography researchers, standards engineers, government cybersecurity officials, infrastructure engineers
topics
Kyber KEM selection; Dilithium signatures; Falcon signature tradeoffs; SPHINCS+ hash signatures; XMSS root signing; hybrid key exchange deployments; TLS 1.3 integration with PQC; IETF X.509/CMS updates; ETSI hybrid concatenate and cascade; PQC migration and crypto inventory
| title | author | length |
|---|---|---|
| Welcome | Paul van Brouwershaven | 07m |
Welcome note describes a nonprofit PKI Consortium with over 70 members and almost 1,000 registrants for the conference, funded by voluntary sponsors and no… | ||
| Status report on Post Quantum Cryptography Standardization | Rene Peralta | 43m |
NIST announces concrete choices and a timeline: Kyber KEM plus signature options Dilithium and Falcon and the hash‑based SPHINCS+ mapped to five security… | ||
| PQC at the Internet Engineering Task Force IETF | Mike Ounsworth | 44m |
IETF is updating TLS, X.509, CMS, CMP and many other specs to accept NIST PQ primitives; eight active Internet-Drafts and a new pqip coordination WG support… | ||
| PQC at the European Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI | Matthew Campagna | 39m |
ETSI documents a decade of work and publishes several technical recommendations plus one technical specification that defines hybrid concatenate and cascade… | ||
| Discussion on standardization | Rene Peralta, Mike Ounsworth, Matthew Campagna | 35m |
Claim that RSA‑2048 can be broken needs 300 and something qubits but also enormous circuit depth so it’s not immediately practical; Kyber weakness is an… | ||
| Mixed Certificate Chains for the Transition to Post Quantum Authentication in PKI | Sebastian Paul | 28m |
Proposes a migration that uses XMSS at root + ECDSA intermediate then replaces ECDSA with lattice schemes, implements it in TLS 1.3 using wolfSSL and Kyber… | ||
| How The Canadian Government is preparing for PQC | Melanie Anderson, Jonathan Hammell | 28m |
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security outlines actionable steps and timelines for the PQC transition and warns against early production rollouts. Key actions… | ||
| Hybrid Approach for quantim safe PKI Development for Organizations HAPKIDO | Gabriele Spini | 20m |
HAPKIDO maps a five‑year, sector‑based migration with concrete deliverables: a proof-of-concept due end of year that implements hybrid certificates for… | ||
| Preparing for and migrating to a world with PQC | Sebastian Paul, Melanie Anderson, Gabriele Spini | 41m |
Panelists give actionable steps: inventory cryptography, form a dedicated team, and rate data by sensitivity and lifetime to set priorities. Labs can… | ||
| Summary and Closing | Paul van Brouwershaven | 10m |
Claims that quantum breaks current public-key cryptography and that long-term secrets (30+ years) are at risk lead to concrete steps: perform a start inventory… | ||
| nothing matches | ||