Platform Markets 2019
2019-09-16..2019-09-19
Berkeley, United States
| title | author | length |
|---|---|---|
| TBD | Michael Schwarz | 47m |
Platforms reduce frictions and turn stocks into tradable flows: public cloud commoditizes compute, rideshare commoditizes drivers' time becomes a spot… | ||
| Computational Complexity of Matching in Ride Sharing | Amin Saberi | 44m |
A formal model has vertices that stay for d steps and arrive in random order; a simple batching with batch size d+1 is analyzed by reducing competitive… | ||
| The Economics of the Bitcoin Payment System | Jacob Leshno | 47m |
Model treats Bitcoin as a decentralized marketplace where miners earn revenue by including transactions and mining rewards, blocks arrive as a Poisson process… | ||
| Marketplaces and Product Quality | Susan Athey | 44m |
Compares UberX and taxi trips in Chicago using phone telemetry to build a telemetry-based safety index that maps hard brakes, accelerations, phone handling and… | ||
| Consumer Protection in an Online World: An Analysis of Occupational Licensing | Chiara Farronato | 45m |
Uses eight months of platform data (millions of bids, all 50 states) plus a 5,000-person survey and an event‑study that exploits the 5.5‑day average lag… | ||
| Ratings Design and Barriers to Entry | Nikhil Vellodi | 49m |
Model with firms of binary hidden quality that learn through noisy consumer reviews and endogenous sales; consumers see posterior ratings and randomly ration… | ||
| Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms | Yash Kanoria | 44m |
Model has dynamic arrivals and departures, idiosyncratic match values discoverable only by paying screening cost C, and agents solve simple MDPs so equilibria… | ||
| Stochastic Matching with Few Queries | Soheil Behnezhad | 45m |
Non-adaptive algorithm draws R independent sampled realizations, takes a maximum matching from each, and queries the union; R is poly(1/p) so maximum degree… | ||
| Incentivizing Exploration among Behavioral Agents with Unbiased Histories | Nicole Immorlica | 48m |
Model assumes two arms with binary rewards, agents estimate payoffs by empirical averages and see only sub histories chosen ex ante. Main claim is a… | ||
| Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative signals and Match Recommendations | Peng Shi | 44m |
Models a two-sided market with firms' utility split into observable public scores and unobserved private scores, and agents learn via choice-function queries… | ||
| The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Artificial Currencies | Sid Banerjee | 47m |
Sid Banerjee (Cornell University)
https://simons.berkeley.edu/talks/unreasonable-effectiveness-artificial-currencies
Platform Markets | ||
| Matching Algorithms for Blood Donation | John Dickerson | 48m |
Facebook’s donation product connects 35 million registered donors to hospitals and drives via push notifications and models donor-to-recipient matching with a… | ||
| Optimal Growth in Two-Sided Markets | Garret Van Ryzin | 52m |
A macro control model ties buyer and seller stocks to a homogeneous production function, adoption and attrition dynamics, and platform-set prices and wages… | ||
| Matching Markets: Managing Scale and Accuracy | Nicolas Stier-Moses | 46m |
Competitive-equilibrium models are used to price and assign billions of items by compressing the value matrix via compact market via clustering or low-rank… | ||
| Platforms and Marketplaces: Past Lessons and Future Possibilities | Simon Rothman, Steve Tadelis | 01h 09m |
Defines a marketplace as one with no balance sheet: assets and workers are owned by others, matching supply and demand and building trust. Calls Lime a service… | ||
| nothing matches | ||