Online and Matching-Based Market Design 2023
2023-10-26..2023-10-27
Berkeley, United States
as the organisers put it
This short-format program will focus on the design of markets for online platforms, exploiting advances in theoretical computer science, economics and operations research.
who it's for
market designers, matching theorists, mechanism designers, algorithmic economists, operations researchers, econometricians, auction designers
topics
matching with transferable utility; separable matching estimation; Hylland-Zeckhauser computation hardness; optimal transport for stable matching; reserves and quotas rules; knapsack with strategic investment (XCONE FPTAS); autobidding bid scaling and LP duality; LP duality for cores and imputations; hedonic games and SCC core; matching with costly disclosure; stability in trading networks
| title | author | length |
|---|---|---|
| Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment | Paul Milgrom | 49m |
Shows that many fast approximation algorithms can drop from near‑optimal allocation performance to 0% once strategic investments are allowed, and proves the… | ||
| Endogenous Market Formation: Theory and Evidence from Chilean College Admissions | Soohyung Lee | 32m |
Argues that colleges voluntarily form centralized matching when they are comparable in quality and applicant coverage, using a simple two-sided model where an… | ||
| The Intractability of Hylland-Zeckhauser and its Aftermath | Thorben Tröbst | 36m |
The Hylland‑Zeckhauser pseudo‑market produces ex‑ante envy‑free, Pareto‑optimal fractional matchings but equilibria can be irrational and computing them is… | ||
| Estimating Separable Matching Models | Bernard Salanié | 27m |
Proposes two practical estimators for separable transferable-utility matching: a minimum distance estimator that matches observed cell shares to the model… | ||
| Market Design for Priority-Based Assignment with Distributional Objectives | Atila Abdulkadiroglu | 34m |
Provides an axiomatic derivation of reserves-and-quotas choice rules for type-specific seats and shows a particular regular reserves-and-quotas rule uniquely… | ||
| Strict Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Hedonic Games with Friend-Oriented Preferences | Bettina Klaus | 29m |
Shows that the SCC partition of the directed friendship graph is always in the strict core for friend-oriented hedonic games, and the mechanism that outputs… | ||
| Revealed Preferences of One-Sided Matching | Andrew Tai | 25m |
Builds an agent-level directed graph with an arc from each agent to every agent who holds the object that agent receives, then partitions the graph into… | ||
| Stable Matching by Optimal Transport | Federico Echenique | 33m |
Introduces a model with aligned preferences (u=v) and uses optimal transport to show concrete links: a family of transport costs c_alpha = (1/alpha)(1−e^{alpha… | ||
| Simple Proofs of Important Results in Market Design | Alvin Roth | 43m |
Sketches of concrete claims and constructive tools: deferred acceptance (DA) is proved verbally to always terminate and yield a man‑optimal stable matching… | ||
| Matching and Disclosure | Hector Chade | 32m |
Builds a matching model with pre-match costly information and voluntary versus mandatory disclosure, solves for Perfect Bayesian equilibria with stable… | ||
| Auto-bidding, Auctions, and Ad Allocation | Aranyak Mehta | 42m |
Autobidding agents model targets (e.g., Target CPA) via an integer program relaxed to an LP whose dual yields a simple uniform bid scaling — bid = multiplier ×… | ||
| LP-Duality and the Cores of Games | Vijay V. Vazirani | 45m |
LP duality and complementary slackness drive three concrete results: a class of matching-based games with a full core characterization plus polynomial LPs that… | ||
| High Dimensional Calibration for Rational Decision Making | Aaron Roth | 29m |
Provides an algorithm that produces d‑dimensional forecasts whose worst‑case bias grows like root t (up to a log factor in the number of events) and runs in… | ||
| Stability in Tranding Networks | Zsuzsanna Jankó | 42m |
Defines trail-stability as immunity to consecutive pairwise deviations along a directed trail and proves existence whenever firms’ choice functions satisfy… | ||
| Complementarities and Externalities | Thanh Nguyen | 44m |
Proposes a relax-and-round method that converts fractional solutions (LP relaxations, lotteries) into integer outcomes with bounded violations, using Scarf's… | ||
| nothing matches | ||