NDC Security 2026
2026-03-02..2026-03-05
Oslo, Norway
[NDC Security 2022, NDC Security 2023, NDC Security 2024, NDC Security 2025, NDC Security 2026]
| title | author | length |
|---|---|---|
| One shop's timing issue is another mans free dogfood | Even Tillerli | 11m |
A retailer coupon lets every seventh bag be free but online and in-store counters lag, so two purchases made within a 2-minute span in 2024 and again in 2025… | ||
| Ctrl+Alt+Deceit - The Game Jam Scam | Sean Sinclair | 11m |
A purported indie game link installs a Discord token stealer — a BBY stealer variant — which drops into startup, harvests OS and browser credentials, reads… | ||
| The dark art of OIDC abuse - A case study in Entra ID | Cody Burkard | 09m |
Claims an OIDC flaw in Azure DevOps where the subject parameter sent by user is accepted by a weird serviceendpointendpointproxy request, letting an attacker… | ||
| Security Starts With Plain Language | Håvard Eide | 10m |
Argues plain language functions as a security control and shows concrete tooling: uses ISO 24495 plain language and RFC 2119 keywords to codify requirements… | ||
| Trusting AI with Code: How Secure is AI-written code? | Mackenzie Jackson | 12m |
97% of developers use AI code helpers and experiments find about 40% of generated apps contain known vulnerabilities, with 20% of orgs reporting serious… | ||
| Chasing Unicorns: A Lovable Security Story | Bendik Schartum Thorbjørnsen, Karim El-Melhaoui | 10m |
Research into the fastest unicorns finds the same mutable user.mail claim misuse across multiple SaaS platforms; researchers set up SAML/OIDC federation +… | ||
| What my cats taught me about implementing a new framework | Inge Amdal Halvorsen | 09m |
Builds a physical chip-controlled cat flap by cutting a hole in a door and wiring a token-based access reader; registers cat RFID chips with treats and manual… | ||
| Trust, Design, and the Reality of Security Engineering in an AI-Driven World | Patricia R | 12m |
A cloud security engineer explains how AI speeds generation of PowerShell and Python scripts that produce deterministic reports yet introduces… | ||
| Has your flight been cancelled? You might be eligible for a cybersec session! | Konstantinos Fouzas | 35m |
Five major European airports see check-in and baggage outages on 19 Sept 2025 traced to Collins Aerospace’s MUSE multi‑user system environment after attackers… | ||
| Zero-Knowledge Proofs: Simultaneously ensuring integrity and privacy | Tjerand Silde | 44m |
Zero-knowledge proofs let one prove correctness without revealing secrets, with concrete deployments and tools: lattice-based FIPS 204 ML-DSA signatures… | ||
| MCP Security: Keep Your AI Agents from Spilling the Tea | Manfred Bjørlin, Awar Abdulkarim | 44m |
Demo runs on Azure using KAgent/KMCP to self‑host models (Ollama, OpenAI via Azure) and expose controlled MCP tools; shows practical RBAC patterns, an RFC 8693… | ||
| The evolution of fighting crime. From handcuffs to keyboard. | Ruben van Well | 44m |
Covers concrete law-enforcement outcomes: takedown of Genesis Market (2M profiles) with 120 arrests in 17 countries, creation of an anti‑infostealer signature… | ||
| Prompt Hardening - Secure Code Generation Using AI | Sean Sinclair | 45m |
A reproducible evaluation harness uses PromptFoo and OpenRouter-connected models (Gemini 1.5 Pro, Claude Opus, GPT‑3.5 Codex, GPT‑4o mini, GPT‑5.1/5 mini) and… | ||
| AI Agents and Jupyter Notebooks for Security Data Analysis | Roberto Rodriguez | 01h 04m |
Claim: letting an AI agent run Python inside a live Jupyter notebook to load query results as a DataFrame and do post-query filtering, grouping and… | ||
| Securing Code in the Age of AI | Simona Toader | 58m |
AI-augmented development speeds feature delivery but multiplies risk: the talk shows a live demo wiring GitHub Copilot instructions, custom agents, and skills… | ||
| Automated Security Testing with OWASP Nettacker | Sam Stepanyan | 54m |
OWASP Nettacker is a Python scanning framework that runs scans across IP ranges, domains and subdomains, ships 120+ modules for port, vuln and brute‑force… | ||
| Breaking the Black Box: Why Testing Generative AI Is Full Spectrum | Jason Ross | 01h 02m |
Black‑and‑white pen testing fails for generative AI because models behave probabilistically, hallucinate, and require behavioral persuasion rather than code… | ||
| OWASP Juice Shop: Take your security vitamins! | Jannik Hollenbach, Björn Kimminich | 01h 05m |
OWASP Juice Shop is a deliberately vulnerable realistic web shop that ships as a single Docker image (Node.js/Express backend, Angular v20 frontend… | ||
| It is rough without a WAF | José Carlos Chávez | 46m |
2025 shows rapid exploit weaponization and most disclosed CVEs are classic web issues like XSS and SQLi, so a WAF provides immediate, network-wide protection… | ||
| Who Gave the Agent Admin Rights?! Securing Cloud & AI Machine Identities | Bodhisattva Das | 51m |
Shows how a misconfigured WAF plus an over‑privileged IAM role lets an attacker grab temporary creds from 169.254.169.254 IMDS access and siphon data from 700… | ||
| AppSec Security: The SDLC in the age of agentic | Jon McCoy | 35m |
Practical roadmap for securing agentic systems that prioritizes data-lake defence (claims ~50% of breaches stem from data lakes and notes risk when 700… | ||
| Protocol-Hopping C2: Transport-Agnostic Command & Control That Won't Die | Francine Solheim | 19m |
A tiny Python-based C2 lab implements a stateful core with pluggable adapters that successfully fails over live from HTTP headers to DNS TXT records and then… | ||
| ¥app.alert(1) is the new alert(1): PDFs as a vector to inject JavaScript in web apps | Luigi Gubello | 52m |
Shows concrete exploit paths: app.alert(1) is often benign but attackers chain real issues in libraries like PDF.js and Apryse Webviewer to run JS… | ||
| From WAN to NAS: A Pwn2Own Journey Through the SOHO Attack Surface | Daan Keuper | 47m |
A complete Pwn2Own chain demonstrates remote compromise of a QNAP router and pivot to a TrueNAS Mini X, using seven distinct attack steps that include UART… | ||
| Attacking AI | Jason Haddix | 56m |
Seven-step methodology targets inputs, ecosystem, front-end model, prompt engineering, data stores, application layers and pivoting to impact; case studies… | ||
| Secure and Compliant APIs - By Design | Daniel Sandberg, Tobias Ahnoff | 51m |
Adds a missing market-level authorization check to a .NET products API, proves the bug with unit and system tests, and then automates detection by feeding a… | ||
| Beyond the Commit: Weaponizing and Hardening GitHub Actions | Niek Palm | 55m |
Shows how GitHub Actions get weaponized and how to harden them with concrete fixes: attackers mutate tags to push malicious actions (example… | ||
| Have I Been Pwned - A Passkey Journey | Stefán Jökull Sigurðarson | 54m |
Have I Been Pwned implements WebAuthn passkeys as a faster replacement for magic links, using ASP.NET Core backend, TypeScript client code and GitHub Copilot… | ||
| How to Know Your Client Is Real: Hardware-Backed Authentication Patterns | Victor Lyuboslavsky | 53m |
Hardware-backed keys are non-exportable so signatures prove use not copy; enrollment generates a device-bound key inside TPM or Secure Enclave, produces a TPM… | ||
| Your Website Is Running Code You’ve Never Seen | Scott Helme | 57m |
Websites load huge unseen third-party JavaScript — 98.1% of pages and a median of 680 KB of JS — which can be modified via S3 or Google Tag Manager… | ||
| sshlogin: securely authenticating to remote Linux systems via ... | Ignat Korchagin | 50m |
Proposal to reuse existing SSH keys for text-only emergency logins by turning SSH keypairs into an ECDH-based challenge that produces a short base64 OTP (demo… | ||
| Learning security monitoring through failure | Truls Dahlsveen | 46m |
Security monitoring focuses on concrete failures and fixes: cloud logging can cost 300,000 NOK/week for noisy Kubernetes ingestion, default vendor retention… | ||
| Connecting the dots to go from tabular security incident data to behavioral graph understanding | Sindre Breda, Manfred Cheung | 45m |
Converts network logs into explicit connection graphs and shows this makes multi-hop reconnaissance and exfiltration obvious: a public NetFlow set becomes 400k… | ||
| The Risky Business, of AI Illiteracy | Sean Juroviesky | 52m |
Argues that AI risks mostly repackage familiar threats and urges concrete controls: build full inventories, data‑flow diagrams, and threat models; enforce… | ||
| Post-quantum cryptography for .NET developers | Filip W | 59m |
Explains concrete migration steps: NIST standards (Kyber ML-KEM, Dilithium ML-DSA), timeline (2035 target but hardware papers push qubit needs down toward… | ||
| Three decades of curl | Daniel Stenberg | 48m |
Curl grows from a 100‑line HTTP tool in 1996 to a 172,000‑line C library and CLI that supports 29 protocols and roughly 30 billion installations across phones… | ||
| Hijacking Google’s CI/CD Through Prompt Injection:The New Era of AI-Based Exploits | Mackenzie Jackson | 34m |
Aikido Security demonstrates that prompt injection moves from nuisance to critical when AI agents inside CI/CD have privileged tool access, showing… | ||
| Is Your Approach to Pipeline Security Flawed? Rethinking CI/CD Security | Patricia Rodrigues | 37m |
Shows concrete CI/CD failures and fixes: pipelines gain privileges via pipeline resources as credentials, branches run different pipeline configs so… | ||
| Anti-Patterns: How to Not implement a Cloud Security tool | Johan Paramanathan | 39m |
A practical checklist for buying and deploying cloud security platforms that names real failure modes and fixes: common anti‑patterns are choosing the wrong… | ||
| What's New in ASVS V5 | Eden Yardeni | 45m |
ASVS v5 (first major release since 2021) reorganizes controls for code-level verification, rebalanced maturity levels (previously ~130 “must” checks crowded… | ||
| MITRE ATT&CK for Developers | Chris Ayers | 58m |
MITRE ATT&CK complements OWASP by mapping real adversary behavior (14 tactics, 200+ techniques) to concrete development controls: use managed identities and… | ||
| Worms in our software supply chain - Where do we go from here? | Charlie Eriksen | 01h 01m |
Open-source registries see fast-moving worms that compromise accounts via command-injection in GitHub Actions, pull NPM tokens and seed systems with an LLM or… | ||
| The server that talked back: a deep dive into SSRFs | Sofia Lindqvist | 53m |
This talk was recorded at NDC Security in Oslo, Norway. #ndcsecurity #ndcconferences #security #developer #softwaredeveloper
Attend the next NDC… | ||
| Safe by design: the UX of secure banking | Dora Makszy | 49m |
Mobile banking authentication is reframed as continuous risk management rather than a fixed feature: device binding, biometrics, and PINs are combined into… | ||
| ASP.NET Core meets OWASP Top 10 2025 | Anders Abel | 58m |
Compares OWASP Top 10 2025 item by item and shows which risks ASP.NET Core actually mitigates: data protection API handles IVs/keys and authenticated… | ||
| Won't somebody please think of the children!? | Niall Merrigan | 01h 01m |
Details of real cases and tools: a catfisher uses Snapchat quick add to pose as teens, harvest images and issue threats; one offender tricks roughly 3,500… | ||
| What we can learn from the World's Biggest Heists | James Birnie | 57m |
Three recent heists trace a clear pattern: the Ronin bridge where Ronin bridge validators (9 total, 5 to sign) are weakened because Sky Mavis controls four… | ||
| Getting Authorization Right in .NET: Patterns, Pitfalls... | Michele Leroux Bustamante | 01h 07m |
Concrete .NET code demos show policy creation, custom IAuthorizationRequirement handlers with DI, and minimal APIs and authorization handlers wired into… | ||
| Keynote: 25 Years of the Microsoft SDL | Michael Howard | 01h 01m |
SDL reaches about 25 years and claims concrete wins: buffer overruns like Slammer (256 bytes read into 128-byte buffer) become non-compilable today via… | ||
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