Matching and Objectives
2019-09-06
Berkeley, United States
who it's for
market designers, matching theorists, mechanism designers, economists, platform engineers, operations researchers
topics
carpooling matching; time-dependent tolling; Vickrey bottleneck example; constant-regret online decisions; resolving threshold algorithms; ad mediation chains; non-transparent Dutch auctions; substitutable hiring rules; costly information acquisition; no justified envy fairness; McAfee trade reduction; online matching with deadlines
| title | author | length |
|---|---|---|
| Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars | Michael Ostrovsky | 53m |
Argues that combining frictionless time-dependent tolls (GPS/license-plate systems like Singapore’s 2020 rollout) with practical carpooling matching produces… | ||
| A Simple Condition for Constant Regret in Online Decision-Making | Daniel Freund | 48m |
Claims a simple sufficient condition that guarantees uniform loss independent of T for stochastic online decision problems (examples: bin packing, network… | ||
| Open Problems in the Display Ads Market Place | Balu Sivan | 46m |
Publishers use mediation that runs chains of length 50 and calls the same demand source many times, often sequentially at falling reserves, creating a… | ||
| Job Matching under Constraints | Fuhito Kojima | 46m |
Characterizes exactly which hiring rules keep firms’ demand substitutability under transferable salaries: feasible sets that are interval constraints… | ||
| Information Acquisition Costs in Matching Markets | Ireno Lo | 57m |
Many-to-one matching with costly, endogenous information uses a Weitzman-style search model where each student pays inspection costs to learn college-specific… | ||
| Fairness and Efficiency for Probabilistic Allocations with Endowments | Federico Echenique | 54m |
Proposes a concrete fairness rule called no justified envy that tolerates envy only when swapping would violate the other agent’s endowment, proves existence… | ||
| The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Worst-Case Guarantee... | Yonah Carmi | 44m |
Maximizes gains from trade in double auctions and matching markets by combining McAfee trade reduction when the efficient trade size Q ≥ 2 with a restricted… | ||
| On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets | Vahideh Manshadi | 47m |
Formal model with two arrival types (hard/easy), stochastic pool dynamics and myopic matching shows myopic matching is asymptotically optimal — waiting… | ||
| Online Matching for Ride-sharing | Zhiyi Huang | 52m |
A new fully online matching model lets every request arrive and expire with deadlines and overlapping time windows, capturing ride‑sharing pairings on general… | ||
| Faira, an application of Game Theory in Real Estate | Kamal Jain | 01h 01m |
Faira builds an online listing and bidding platform that runs a second-price auction, posts full disclosures and inspection reports, and assumes performance… | ||
| Dynamically Stable Matching | Laura Doval | 51m |
Defines dynamic stability for two-sided, irreversible matchings with arrivals, proves existence for any finite horizon (any arrival distribution) by a… | ||
| Design of Lotteries and Waitlists for Affordable Housing Allocation | Moshe Baird | 50m |
Model shows standard waitlists and independent lotteries yield the same matching probability, match-value distribution and expected wait under iid preferences… | ||
| nothing matches | ||