Hardwear.io USA 2024
2024-05-31..2024-06-01
Santa Clara, United States
[hardwear.io USA 2019, Hardwear.io USA 2023, Hardwear.io USA 2024, Hardwear.io USA 2026]
| title | author | length |
|---|---|---|
| Exposing Critical Threats In Millions Of Connected Devices | Alexander, Sergey | 44m |
Describes full-chain compromise of a cellular modem: firmware dumped by decapping and NAND read, custom PCB to expose test pads, and over 300 AT-style commands… | ||
| TPM 2.0 Attestable Firmware: Recovering Trust After Firmware Flaws | Chris Fenner, Jeff Andersen | 25m |
Shows how TPM 2.0 Library v183 adds new handles to CreatePrimary so the TPM mixes a bootloader-provided, version-unique secret into its DRBG and yields… | ||
| Panel: A New Root Of Trust: Changing Computing With TEE | 41m | |
Panel gives a concrete account of trusted execution: CPU-built TEEs (Intel SGX/TDX, ARM CCA Realms, AMD SEV SNP, Nvidia H100) encrypt runtime memory and… | ||
| SRAM Data Remanence In SoCs: Covert Storage And Exfiltration Risks In TEE | Jubayer Mahmod | 42m |
Shows that SRAM startup remnants can be written into and read out by accelerating transistor aging with elevated voltage and temperature (oven or overvolting… | ||
| Building A Silicon Analysis Toolkit | Hash Salehi | 36m |
Makes fuming nitric acid from KNO3 + H2SO4 using a home distillation flask, condenser and aquarium pump, then stores it in a dual-container system with sodium… | ||
| Who Monitors The Monitors? Hacking The Monitor Control Command Set | Eugene Lim | 34m |
Research maps MCCS/DDC as a bidirectional host–monitor channel, extracts manufacturer-specific VCP codes (E2‑FF manufacturer opcodes), and uses Frida hooks on… | ||
| Panel: The Right To Secure; What, Who, How And Why! | 42m | |
Panel argues for a practical right to secure: allow owners to patch end‑of‑life embedded gear when vendors refuse, backed by automated firmware analysis and… | ||
| TPMs & The Linux Kernel: Unlocking A Better Path To Hardware Security | Ignat Korchagin | 45m |
Proposes using the Linux kernel key store to let applications use TPM-held keys without reimplementing TSS stacks, implements a Python request_key plugin that… | ||
| Breaking Into Chips By Reading The Datasheet | Mark Omo, James Rowley | 33m |
Reverse-engineers extract firmware from a 40‑year‑old Renesas 78K0‑series micro by abusing documented flash commands and on‑chip verification logic instead of… | ||
| BarraCUDA: GPUs Do Leak DNN Weights | Peter Horvath | 29m |
Physical access to edge devices plus simple probes and DPA let attackers recover neural net weights from GPU power/package leakage. Reverse‑engineered CUDA… | ||
| Welcome Note | John McMaster | 13m |
Conference history and specifics: first US edition was 2019 and the event brings hands-on gear like X-ray machines and wire bonders in the hall, demos such as… | ||
| Secrets Of Simos18: REng The Secure Boot Mechanism Of An ECU | Brian Ledbetter | 41m |
Reverses the Simos18 ECU secure boot to get arbitrary code execution and full reflashing on a 2016 Golf 7R. Uses a Raspberry Pi CAN stack, Python UDS library… | ||
| LeapFrog: The Rowhammer Instruction Skip Attack | Andrew, Caner, Berk | 34m |
Rowhammer flips saved return addresses in memory so a single one bit flip in a stack-stored return pointer causes an instruction to be skipped, letting… | ||
| After-Movie | 03m | |
Transcript shows only repeated music markers and a single word in Urdu, so the video is a score-led highlight reel with music-only montage, no spoken content… | ||
| Integrating AI With Retro Hardware:A Commodore 64 LLM Module | Konrad, Marek | 40m |
Built a Commodore 64 LLM module that sits on the user port, uses a tiny ARM board with 8 GB RAM and a lightweight embedding model (<0.5 GB), and serves queries… | ||
| My Car, My Keys: Obtaining CAN Bus SecOC Signing Keys | Willem, Greg | 44m |
Fault injection unlocks the locked bootloader of a 2021 power‑steering ECU, firmware dump leads to reverse engineering that finds AES CMAC implemented in… | ||
| State-of-the-Art Anti-Counterfeiting: Attacks And Countermeasures | Scott Best | 44m |
Modern anti‑counterfeiting measures target concrete attack paths and real costs: an authentication die of ~2×2 mm yields about 28,000 die per 300 mm wafer, a… | ||
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