CYBERWARCON 2022
2022-11-10
-- online --
[CYBERWARCON 2018, CYBERWARCON 2019, CYBERWARCON 2021, CYBERWARCON 2022, CYBERWARCON 2025]
who it's for
threat intelligence analysts, influence operations researchers, national security policymakers, cyber defense operators, incident responders, osint researchers, malware analysts
topics
russian cyber operations effectiveness; polish-language influence operations; online operations kill chain; gan-synthesized profile photos; supply-chain phishing campaigns; rtf template injection; xor-encoded shellcode payloads; china cybersecurity talent pipeline; 48-hour vulnerability disclosure rule; fake job-site entrapment; telegram-centric deplatforming and pivot; maritime gray-zone cyber activity
| title | author | length |
|---|---|---|
| Were Russian cyber operations militarily effective in Ukraine? If not, why? | Gavin Wilde, John Bateman | 10m |
Claim: Russian cyber operations produce little battlefield effect compared with kinetic strikes. Public evidence shows no known compromises of Ukrainian… | ||
| NDP: Polish-Language IO Campaign’s Role within RU’s Prop. and Disinfo. Ecosystem | Sam Riddell, David Mainor | 12m |
Mandiant maps NDP as a pro‑Russian Polish‑language influence campaign centered on Niezależny Dziennik Polityczny with clear links to Ghostwriter, using 28… | ||
| Breaking Silos and Speaking The Same Language | Ben Nimmo, Eric Hutchins | 34m |
Meta presents a concrete framework called the Online Operations Kill Chain that breaks operations into 10 phases (asset acquisition through persistence) and is… | ||
| China Stands Up: Cybersecurity Talent and Innovative Policies in Xi's China | Dakota Cary | 10m |
After 2013 Xi elevates cybersecurity into a CCP standing committee and creates the Cyberspace Administration, China builds a talent pipeline: formalized… | ||
| Rising Tide Redux: Leviathan's Supply Chain Attacks & Kinetic Naval Intervention | Mike Raggi | 28m |
Leviathan, a Chinese APT tied to the MSS per the DOJ indictment, conducts persistent supply‑chain phishing against South China Sea naval and energy projects… | ||
| Mossad.com: How Iran is Using Fake Job Sites and Movie Studios to Catch Moles | Adam Rawnsley | 21m |
An Iran-linked cluster builds fake Mossad job sites and a bogus film studio to lure IRGC, Assad-regime, and Hezbollah security vets, using Google Ads, Telegram… | ||
| nothing matches | ||