Cryptography Boot Camp 2015
2015-05-18..2015-05-22
Berkeley, United States
| title | author | length |
|---|---|---|
| The Mathematics of Lattices I | Vinod Vaikuntanathan | 01h 08m |
Introduces lattices as integer linear combinations and frames the key problems: SVP (shortest nonzero vector) and SIVP (short independent vectors). States… | ||
| The Mathematics of Lattices II | Vinod Vaikuntanathan | 01h 04m |
Defines short integer solutions (SIS) and decisional LWE and gives the concrete reductions: SIS yields collision-resistant hashes, LWE (search ↔ decisional up… | ||
| Fully Homomorphic Encryption I | Shai Halevi | 45m |
Explains a concrete LWE-based GSW scheme that turns ciphertexts into matrices and uses a gadget matrix/G inverse decomposition so long-entry matrices become… | ||
| Fully Homomorphic Encryption II | Shai Halevi | 01h 04m |
Shows how bootstrapping/recryption turns a bounded-depth GSW-style scheme into fully homomorphic encryption by homomorphically evaluating decryption, with the… | ||
| Multilinear Maps and Attacks I | Sanjam Garg | 01h 00m |
Describes lattice-based multilinear maps built over R = Z[x]/(x^n+1) with encodings as short numerators modulo an ideal generated by a small g and masked by… | ||
| Multilinear Maps and Attacks II | Sanjam Garg | 51m |
Describes concrete breaks of candidate multilinear maps: publishing encodings of zero and a zero-test value lets an attacker recover short CRT components (a… | ||
| Obfuscation I | Amit Sahai | 58m |
Proposes a concrete candidate for indistinguishability obfuscation that encodes matrix branching programs with Kilian randomization and multilinear-map… | ||
| Obfuscation II | Amit Sahai | 01h 02m |
Candidate obfuscator compiles circuits into a matrix branching program randomized by Kilian randomization and protected by multilinear encodings and per-input… | ||
| Applications of Obfuscation I | Craig Gentry | 01h 12m |
Defines indistinguishability obfuscation and shows concrete consequences: builds witness encryption from IO, derives public‑key encryption by publishing… | ||
| Applications of Obfuscation II | Craig Gentry | 50m |
Shows that indistinguishability obfuscation yields extraction when two circuits differ on a single input by using a binary search extract over obfuscated… | ||
| Delegating Computation I | Yael Tauman Kalai | 59m |
Constructs a practical path from multiprover proofs to a single-cloud protocol: a two-message delegation scheme for RAM-style computations whose verifier time… | ||
| Delegating Computation II | Yael Tauman Kalai | 01h 06m |
Constructs a no-signaling MIP for deterministic time-T computations that yields a two-message delegation protocol after composing with fully homomorphic… | ||
| Secure Multiparty Computation I | Yuval Ishai | 58m |
Covers when MPC is possible and how: information-theoretic security needs an honest majority (<k/2 corrupted) while computational security (via OT hybrid… | ||
| Secure Multiparty Computation II | Yuval Ishai | 01h 10m |
Uses a correlated randomness dealer that gives each party additive shares of a shifted truth table (random cyclic DX,DY) so online the parties exchange only… | ||
| Garbled Circuits I | Benny Applebaum | 01h 07m |
Starts from precise definitions of garbled circuits as randomized encodings and works through simple encodings to a general template that yields Yao-style… | ||
| Garbled Circuits II | Benny Applebaum | 44m |
Benny Applebaum, Tel Aviv University
Cryptography Boot Camp
http://simons.berkeley.edu/talks/benny-applebaum-2015-05-21b | ||
| Oblivious RAM I | Elaine Shi, Daniel Wichs | 01h 15m |
Describes why encrypted memory leaks via access patterns in SGX and cloud settings then gives concrete ORAM constructions, costs, and implementations. Tree… | ||
| Oblivious RAM II | Elaine Shi, Daniel Wichs | 01h 06m |
Describes two concrete advances and what they actually build: an OnionORAM that achieves constant communication per access by shaving the usual log N factor at… | ||
| Differential Privacy: Fundamentals to Forefront I | Cynthia Dwork | 01h 00m |
Formalizes differential privacy as outputs changing by at most an e^epsilon factor when any one person is added or removed; gives concrete mechanisms… | ||
| Differential Privacy: Fundamentals to Forefront II | Cynthia Dwork | 01h 10m |
Defines the privacy loss random variable and relaxes pure privacy to epsilon delta so composition error grows like √k (with log(1/δ) factors) instead of k… | ||
| nothing matches | ||